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3
Is There a Xi Jinping 
Model of Economic Reform?
Barry Naughton
University of California, San Diego
Since becoming president of the People’s Republic of China in 2012, 
Xi Jinping has shaken up every aspect of Chinese policy. In the economic 
realm, Xi laid out an ambitious program of reform in the Third Plenum 
Resolution of November 2013. However, since that time, progress on 
economic reform has been slow and uneven. While reform is certainly 
not dead, there is real reason to question the consistency and eff ective-
ness of Xi’s economic policies. This analysis is based on three short steps. 
First, China is currently undergoing a growth transition. As the period of 
“miracle growth” ends, nearly every aspect of policy must adapt to a 
new economic environment. Second, contrary to what we would nor-
mally expect under such conditions, Xi Jinping’s policy agenda generally 
relies on a strengthening of government and, especially, party interven-
tion in the society and economy. This orientation is very diff erent from 
what we would expect for a country moving into middle-income status 
whose society is far richer and more successful than ever before. Third, 
the result is a policy regime marked by inconsistent and sometimes con-
tradictory objectives. Xi has attempted to overwhelm these inconsisten-
cies by developing a centralized policy process that gives him very direct 
control over specifi c policy outcomes. However, it is unlikely that this 
approach will succeed in a country as big and complex as China.
THE END OF MIRACLE GROWTH
Between 1978 and 2010, the Chinese economy grew at an average 
rate of just over 10 percent a year. However, in 2010 the growth rate 
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fell below 8 percent and was 6.7 percent in 2016. This slowdown is not 
a short-term, cyclical slowdown but, rather, the refl ection of a historical 
turning point. China’s miracle growth period was quite similar to that 
which was experienced earlier by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. China’s 
growth lasted longer, to be sure, perhaps because some processes of 
structural change had been delayed during the Cultural Revolution and 
ended up contributing to the miracle phase of 1978–2010. We learned 
from the forerunner economies that when the end of the miracle growth 
era comes, it is often surprisingly abrupt and diffi  cult to manage. This is 
the case with China as well. 
China’s economic policy was uniquely well adapted to the high-
growth era. Government policy stressed investment, and infrastruc-
ture was built out ahead of demand. Since there was a huge reservoir 
of underutilized labor in the countryside eager to move into the cities, 
building the roads, factories, airports, and railroads at maximum speed 
was eff ective in maintaining high-speed growth. After China entered the 
World Trade Organization in 2001 with a network of export-oriented 
factories and regions already in place, there was virtually no limit to 
the speed with which exports could grow and industrialization could 
proceed. China could follow the precedents of earlier developing econo-
mies, copying and adapting hard and soft technologies, and reproducing 
systems of infrastructure.
Those days are over. As China moves into middle-income range 
it is immediately confronted with three fundamental challenges. The 
fi rst is the end of “Cheap China.” As the pool of underutilized labor 
in the countryside has been drawn down, wages for unskilled workers 
have risen rapidly. As Figure 3.1 shows, unskilled wages increased par-
ticularly rapidly from 2008 to 2013. Since 2014 and 2015, the pace of 
wage growth has slowed but still remains at 7–8 percent. Despite higher 
wages, the pace of migration from the countryside has slowed dramati-
cally in recent years. The lower line in Figure 3.1 shows the growth in 
migrants working outside their home communities. In 2015, the number 
of cross-country migrants increased only 0.4 percent from the previous 
year. The increase in wages inevitably means that China’s competitive-
ness in labor-intensive manufactures is eroding. Producers of garments, 
shoes, and sporting goods are beginning to fi nd that cheaper wages in 
Vietnam and Bangladesh make it worthwhile moving there, even though 
overall productivity is still far below that in China. Most importantly, 
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these changes in relative costs will likely only strengthen in the future. 
This fundamental change in labor costs is strongly correlated with the 
end of the miracle growth era in earlier developing economies such as 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. China, in that sense, is no diff erent. 
In one respect, however, China has a distinctive labor force pro-
blem. Because of the country’s “one-child policy,” cohorts of young 
people entering the labor force today are unusually small. Figure 3.2 is 
a 2014 population age pyramid. It shows that the age groups graduating 
from high school and college are already much smaller than the age 
cohorts just above them, which are the mainstay of the current labor 
force. Indeed, the cohorts entering the labor force are slightly smaller 
than the age groups retiring from active labor. The second challenge is 
thus that since 2010 China’s total labor force has plateaued and actually 
shrunk slightly. The really large decline in China’s labor force will not 
begin until after 2020, but the process has already begun. It is worth 
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emphasizing how diff erent this is from the experience of Japan and 
Korea. In those economies, the end of low-cost labor and the decline 
in total labor force size were two distinct events separated by decades. 
For example, Japan’s fi rst growth slowdown occurred in 1972, but the 
Japanese labor force only began to decline in the late 1990s, more than 
25 years later. In China, both these changes are occurring at the same 
time, which means that the two eff ects reinforce each other, and the 
adaptation is bound to be especially challenging. 
The third challenge is the debt overhang that China has built up over 
the past 7–8 years. China managed to sustain growth through the global 
fi nancial crisis. Moreover, since the crisis, policymakers have attemp-
ted to keep the growth rate from falling too abruptly. In both cases, one 
of the primary tools they have used has been to aggressively expand 
bank lending to keep investment high. For example, one aspect of that 
debt overhang has been the debt accumulated by local government 
“funding vehicles.” Between 2007 and 2014, that debt jumped from 17 
to 35 percent of GDP (Figure 3.3). Debt loads have been increasing in 
Figure 3.2  2014 Population Age Pyramid: Urban and Rural
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other areas of the economy as well. While the overall debt level is not 
yet unsustainable, the trajectory certainly is. China needs to fi nd a way 
to both slow the increase in debt and restructure the portion of debt that 
will never be repaid. In a broader sense, sustaining rapid growth by con-
tinuously increasing credit simply cannot work indefi nitely. Economic 
policy needs to be adapted to be consistent with an economy growing 
in the 5–7 percent range. 
THE POLICY OBJECTIVES
As described above, the end of China’s miracle growth phase echoes 
and recapitulates what happened earlier in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. 
Policymakers in each of those previous miracle growth economies 
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responded in a distinctive fashion, but their responses shared a com-
mon feature: they all moved to a lower-investment and a “lighter touch” 
pattern of government intervention. For Japan and Korea, the heyday 
of government industrial policy occurred before the slowdown, during 
the latter half of the miracle growth era. In those countries, industrial 
policy arguably sustained high growth rates by making sure that the 
economy could move smoothly into large, capital-intensive heavy-
industry sectors. Then, as the miracle growth era ended, both Japan 
and Korea shifted to a less interventionist industrial policy stance. The 
logic was that as these countries approached the world technological 
frontier, it was less likely that government bureaucrats would have an 
advantage over private actors in foreseeing the next stage of technologi-
cal or sectoral evolution. Rather than trying to tell businesses how to 
invest, bureaucrats in Japan and Korea shifted to provide support for 
private businesses in whatever choices they made. Government invest-
ment in research and development, for example, remained high but was 
increasingly carried out by universities and government research insti-
tutes, and it sought to improve society’s general knowledge base. Of 
course, this transition also corresponded with a transition to democ-
racy in both Korea and Taiwan, and in general to more permissive and 
diverse societies. 
Although China has a very diff erent political and economic system 
from Japan and Korea, the general direction in which China has evolved 
since 1978 seemed consistent with the earlier evolution of Korea and 
Japan. Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has stepped back from 
many aspects of society, and as China became richer, Chinese society 
became more diverse and tolerant. However, to a remarkable extent, Xi 
Jinping has sought to reverse this direction. This is most evident in the 
purely political aspects. Xi Jinping has consolidated his own individual 
power more rapidly than anyone expected, and he has established his 
own personal dominance of the political process more thoroughly than 
most believed possible. The result has been a qualitative change from 
what had been called the “collegial enlightened dictatorship” of the 
Deng-Jiang-Hu era toward a more personal rule. Moreover, Xi seeks to 
infuse the political system with a kind of revivalist spirit and a stron-
ger, top-down discipline. He seeks to project his own charismatic rule 
to nearly every corner of the system. We can see this objective in Xi’s 
crusade against corruption, in his focus on strong party leadership, and 
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in the ongoing ideological crackdown that is aff ecting many areas of 
Chinese society.
In a sense, Xi’s policies can be seen as the opposite of those adopted 
in Japan or Korea, but for structurally similar reasons. As Chinese soci-
ety has become middle income, the urgency of political goals has faded 
and materialism and corruption have increased. Rather than acceding to 
those changes, Xi seeks to reverse them. He has laid out an ambitious 
agenda that includes Chinese nationalism, assertive and charismatic 
authoritarian rule, and also economic reform. The question is, do these 
elements fi t together?
Xi Jinping has consistently positioned himself as the architect of a 
signifi cant economic reform program. The Third Plenum, in November 
2013, laid out an economic reform agenda that was bold and broad. 
Although many parts of the reform resolution were vague—as is nor-
mal in top-level China policy documents—a number of concrete com-
mitments were built into the document in order to establish credibility. 
Moreover, Xi Jinping himself took over a new “leadership small group” 
(LSG) that had direct authority over the economic reform process. The 
LSG was an implementation device: the overall reform resolution was 
broken down into 336 “initiatives” that were farmed out to special-
ized subgroups under the LSG. The most important of these subgroups 
from an economic standpoint was the “Economic System and Ecologi-
cal Civilization Specialized Group.” (Paradoxically, it is the only one 
not headed by a Politburo member.) This specialized group was given 
the responsibility for 118 out of the 336 total initiatives. Headed by 
Xi Jinping’s close economic counselor, Liu He, this specialized group 
serves as a kind of economic secretariat, charged with implementing 
Xi’s policy preferences. 
This implementation process is a signifi cant departure from past 
Chinese practice. Since the early 1980s it has been standard practice for 
economic policy to be run directly out of the governmental State Coun-
cil by the premier. Successive premiers Zhao Ziyang, Zhu Rongji, and 
Wen Jiabao all controlled day-to-day economic decision making and 
placed their own personal stamp on economic policy. Under Xi Jinping, 
however, most of the crucial economic decisions relating to economic 
reform have been pulled back into the specialized group.
These changes mean that Xi Jinping’s personal stamp is inevitably 
on the economic reform process. Xi has laid out a set of goals that shape 
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and constrain the economic reform process. He has identifi ed his own 
personal leadership with economic reform. The policy process has been 
changed in important respects that refl ect Xi’s wishes. The success or 
failure of economic reforms in China today, therefore, depend directly 
on whether the “Xi Jinping model” of economic reform is a reality or 
an illusion.
2015: THE ANNUS HORRIBILIS OF ECONOMIC REFORM
Reforms came out of the gate quickly after the Third Plenum in 
November 2013. There was a great deal of activity during 2014 that 
seemed to be focused on moving the reform process ahead in produc-
tive ways. However, during 2015, these initiatives met with unexpected 
problems. Indeed, it is reasonable to say that in 2015 economic reforms 
failed. We can see this in three major reform initiatives:
 1) restructuring local government debt,
 2) opening the stock market, and
 3) state enterprise reform. 
Each of these initiatives went off  track in 2015. Whether they can be 
revived is an open question.
Restructuring Local Government Debt
Beginning in 2014, the Minister of Finance, Lou Jiwei, laid out an 
ambitious program of local debt restructuring. Even more impressive, in 
Lou’s vision, debt restructuring was merely the fi rst phase of a broader 
fi scal system reorganization. After weaning local governments off  their 
dependence on debt, Lou believed he would be able to create appropri-
ate conditions for an across-the-board overhaul of the fi scal system. In 
his original vision, this overhaul would be carried out in three years, 
from 2014 to 2016.
Following Lou’s program, overall government debt was audited 
and offi  cially registered as of December 2014. The intention was to 
cap debt at this year-end level and then begin to transform debt into 
new, local government “municipal bonds,” which would be sold into 
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the marketplace at an interest rate that refl ected the relative creditwor-
thiness of diff erent local governments. This bold vision not only com-
prised restructuring fi scal relations but also the creation of a new fi xed-
income market that would contribute to China’s fi nancial reforms as 
well. However, this initial program of debt restructuring failed. When 
the fi rst batch of bonds created by Jiangsu Province was off ered to the 
market in April 2015, buyers and sellers were unable to agree on an 
interest rate. If this were to be a truly market-based sale of debt, buyers 
wanted substantially higher rates as compensation for their risk than the 
Jiangsu government was willing to pay. The government was forced to 
withdraw the off er.
The program was reformulated and converted essentially into a 
bailout. The mechanism was that the banks, which held the existing 
debt, were now pressured to buy the new municipal bonds. While a fi c-
tion was maintained that the interest rate was to be “mutually agreed,” 
banks were led to understand that the appropriate interest rate should 
be similar to that of central government bonds—that is, extremely low. 
The banks were given some sweeteners to induce their compliance, but 
of course these predominantly state-owned banks could not refuse a 
central government policy initiative in any case. Under these new cir-
cumstances, local debt restructuring proceeded quickly. An initial quota 
of 1 trillion RMB was rapidly converted and, over the course of 2015, 
slightly more than 3 trillion were sold. Further debt restructuring con-
tinued, and even accelerated, and in 2016, an additional 5 trillion RMB 
in debt was converted. 
Debt restructuring achieved some partial objectives, since it low-
ered interest rates and reduced the debt servicing burden on local gov-
ernments. In that sense, it was not a complete failure. However, the 
objective of debt restructuring is not simply to reduce fi nancial burdens 
but also to place the system on a new, more sustainable basis. A restruc-
turing that is little more than a bailout sends a message to local gov-
ernments that fi scally reckless behavior will be accepted and, indeed, 
may be costless. Of course, the Ministry of Finance has argued that 
local governments are no longer allowed to take on any new debt, but 
it remains to be seen whether this prohibition is credible. Moreover, the 
broader Ministry of Finance program of fi scal restructuring is in sham-
bles. Major new taxes have not been introduced, and the restructuring 
of central-local relations is still far over the horizon. 
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Stock Market Reform
Beginning in 2014, Chinese policymakers laid out an ambitious 
reform of equity markets. Two measures exemplifi ed this reform. First, 
all qualifi ed fi rms were allowed to be listed on the market. This was 
a dramatic departure from past procedure in which only a select few 
fi rms, individually approved by the securities regulator, could list on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The old system had unduly favored 
state-owned enterprises and led to delays, ineffi  ciency, and corruption. 
Moreover, the old system had repeatedly tempted the government to 
use the pace of new listings as a tool to manipulate the stock markets’ 
overall level. When the market was sluggish, policymakers would sus-
pend new listings, so market participants could be confi dent that there 
would be no liquidity shocks. Indeed, new listings had been suspended 
for years before 2014. By taking steps to open up the listing process, 
the government was committing to a much more market-driven stock 
market, even at the risk of allowing short-term downward pressure on 
the market. Second, the Chinese stock market was de facto opened up 
to international investors for the fi rst time. The creation of the Hong 
Kong–Shanghai Capital Connect allowed Hong Kong brokers to buy 
and sell shares on the Shanghai market up to a certain relatively gen-
erous quota. Since any international fi nancial institution can maintain 
a Hong Kong subsidiary, this was a tentative and gradualist, but still 
unmistakeable, opening of the Shanghai market to foreign investment.
The impact of these initial reform measures was swept away by a 
huge boom and bust in the Chinese stock market. The Chinese market 
soared to a peak of 5,166 on June 12, 2015. From there, it wobbled 
and then crashed, amid something close to panic, to a low point of 
3,507 on July 8. When the market plummeted, China’s leaders lost their 
nerve. Beginning on July 5, Premier Li Keqiang presided over a series 
of meetings designed to bail out the stock market. An existing organi-
zation, the China Securities Finance Corporation, was provided with 
unlimited liquidity to buy up blue-chip (or, rather, red-chip) stocks. 
Remarkably, despite this massive intervention, the market continued to 
drop for another three days before fi nally stabilizing. With substantial 
direct government ownership now complementing already large state 
enterprise holdings, the stock market ended up further away than ever 
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from genuine marketization. Moreover, public funds had once again 
been used to bail out politically infl uential groups.
From this account, it might seem that Premier Li Keqiang was the 
crucial actor in the stock market fi asco, but that is not the case. The 
entire political leadership, including Xi Jinping, had been complicit in 
statements that directly or indirectly encouraged the stock market bub-
ble. Xi Jinping was widely quoted in Weibo (Chinese Twitter) as having 
advocated much higher market valuations. While there is no offi  cial 
source for these comments, the Chinese government could easily have 
denied or deleted them, had it chosen to do so. It is inconceivable that 
Xi Jinping did not either instruct Li Keqiang to intervene or at least 
signal his support for such intervention. After the bailout, new listings 
were once again suspended. The Hong Kong–Shanghai stock connect 
was still intact, but interest from overseas investors quickly evaporated. 
Not only did the market still seem to be in a bear mode, but the added 
risk of unpredictable government policy was too great for most foreign 
investors to take. A later episode in January 2016 merely accentuated 
these fears. As of mid-2016, government holdings in the stock mar-
ket were still large, and the overall Shanghai index was languishing at 
around 3,000 points, which is to say below what it was after the summer 
of 2015 crash. The overhang of government holdings deters new inves-
tors from entering the market.
State Enterprise Reform
State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform started strong after the Third 
Plenum (November 2013) resolution. It was given high priority in the 
resolution, which also generated excitement because it introduced a 
number of potential innovative approaches. These included an expanded 
role for “mixed ownership,” new investment funds that would manage 
government wealth, and a role for employee share owning. However, 
the attempt to translate these innovative ideas into reality was quickly 
stifl ed. Disagreements about basic defi nitions and philosophy pre-
vented progress. Then, in the summer of 2014, the reform LSG made 
several decisions that thoroughly upended the stalled (but gradual) SOE 
reform process. Most strikingly, the LSG approved a limitation on the 
salaries of SOE managers. This policy, designed to bring SOE manag-
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ers’ salaries in line with those of bureaucrats at a similar level, reduced 
salaries in listed state-owned enterprises and dramatically lowered the 
salaries of managers at Chinese state-owned banks. The abrupt adop-
tion of these salary caps underlined the extent to which Xi Jinping was 
seeking to achieve mixed objectives in his approach to SOEs. 
Perhaps as a result of this confusion, at the same meeting a new spe-
cialized “SOE Reform LSG” was created to hammer out a compromise. 
However, this group—whose composition must have been endorsed by 
Xi Jinping—was headed by a long-time veteran of the economic bureau-
cracy, Vice-Premier Ma Kai. Moreover, it was staff ed by the head of the 
existing agency that controlled SOEs, namely, the State Asset Super-
vision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This choice was 
unfortunate, to say the least. The whole purpose of SOE reform was to 
replace SASAC, which had evolved out of earlier government agencies, 
with a mixed mandate of incremental improvements to state fi rm man-
agement. However, if there were to be a substantial improvement in the 
way state ownership was exercised, it would almost certainly have to 
involve the creation of new kinds of investment funds. By handing the 
design of SOE reform over to SASAC leaders, Xi Jinping eff ectively 
ensured that the creation of new investment funds would be controlled 
by the insiders in charge of existing institutions. SASAC leaders would 
understandably seek to limit change, or at least make sure that any reor-
ganization occurred under their own direct control.
It took one year for the SOE Reform LSG to draft its program. 
When that program fi nally emerged in September 2015, it was marked 
by contradictions and compromises and was met with a general sense 
of disappointment. Underlying this disappointment was the realization 
that SASAC had opted for an extremely gradual process of insider-
controlled change. The 2013 reform resolution had called for the cre-
ation of new “State Capital Investment and Operation Companies.” 
Much of the previous deadlock had been due to competing conceptions 
of what those companies should do. One version of the investment com-
panies, proposed by the Ministry of Finance, held that those companies 
should manage state fi rms as purely fi nancial assets. The investment 
funds would seek to maximize the fi nancial returns of their holdings, 
potentially by having competing managers evaluated by the return they 
generate. This conception evoked comparisons with successful sover-
eign wealth funds, such as Singapore’s Temasek. The alternative ver-
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sion of the investment companies, proposed by SASAC, stressed their 
utility as development agencies. After the SOE reform document was 
published, SASAC announced that it would convert two of its existing 
companies into “State Capital Investment and Operation Companies.” 
These companies were designed to have specifi c developmental objec-
tives and engage in hands-on restructuring. Thus, from the standpoint 
of the fi rms, the new ownership agencies that emerged from the SOE 
reform process were really not much better than the old SASAC control. 
It was clear that Xi Jinping’s vision of SOE reform included many 
competing objectives. Related to his anticorruption drive, Xi clearly 
wanted to improve oversight of SOE management. Paralleling his over-
all stress on Communist Party leadership, Xi insisted that Communist 
Party committees in the enterprise should have fi rst right to discuss 
important strategic decisions on the enterprise. Overall, this meant that 
Xi Jinping was asking for SOEs to be given new tasks and to be subject 
to new oversight, even while telling them they should be given more 
autonomy to work as market-oriented entities.
The above account oversimplifi es the complex process of SOE 
reform. On the positive side, the long, stalled agenda of converting all 
SOEs into corporations, with an established board of directors, has been 
given new momentum. In addition, fi rms are to be categorized accord-
ing to whether they are in a competitive market environment or primar-
ily a public service operation. In addition, many diff erent provinces are 
experimenting with accelerating SOE reform. These positive elements 
may well improve the conduct and performance of China’s SOEs in the 
medium term. But in 2015 it was clear that dramatic progress in SOE 
reform had not been achieved, and this was because of the confl ict-
ing goals and obligations placed on SOEs by top political leadership 
without a dramatic push toward a stronger market orientation. The SOE 
reform that emerged from this jumble of objectives is unlikely to be a 
real reform at all.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
By the end of 2015, all three of the reform initiatives described 
in the previous section had failed. While the government continues 
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to give verbal support to the goals of the Third Plenum, it has tacitly 
acknowledged the failure of the program by shifting emphasis to a new 
reform initiative called “Supply-Side Structural Reform.” First fl oated 
at the end of 2015, this complex new initiative clearly represents a new 
approach. Policymakers have shown some inclination to resume prog-
ress in equity and fi scal system reform, and 2016 was designated as the 
fi rst year of implementation of SOE reform (taking the September 2015 
document as the defi nitive elaboration of the program). However, as of 
2016, progress in these areas has been extremely modest. 
What can we conclude from this situation? First, there is a Xi Jin-
ping model—a model of economic reform that follows from his com-
mitment to top-down, personalized rule. Xi declares a bold set of objec-
tives, but they are not in the form of a broad, philosophical commitment 
to a new type of system; rather, they represent a wish list of objectives 
Xi would like to achieve from the existing system. In order to achieve 
those objectives, Xi sets up a new top-down implementation process. 
At the beginning of the Xi administration, a number of analysts 
suggested that Xi Jinping’s eff orts to concentrate political power on 
its own hands were a necessary prelude to dramatic economic reforms. 
According to this view, entrenched interest groups had made incre-
mental reform increasingly diffi  cult in China. Therefore, an authorita-
tive policymaker would need to concentrate power fi rst and then push 
through with reforms. The experience of 2015 indicates that this view 
has very little explanatory power. On the contrary, concentration of 
power in the hands of just a few may even retard the reform process. 
Xi’s personalized style leads him to impose contradictory demands on 
the reform process. This in turn leads to sometimes abrupt about-faces 
in the tasks set for other policymakers, which is exemplifi ed in each of 
the reform areas discussed in this chapter. Xi’s sudden moves to cap 
SOE salaries, abandon high-quality municipal bond markets, and inter-
vene to save the stock market all had dire implications for the overall 
reform process.
The new organs Xi set up to implement these policies have also not 
worked well. These new agencies do not themselves have direct imple-
mentation capabilities—they can talk about bold reforms, but when it 
comes to actually designing a reform process, they end up falling back 
on the same government agencies that cater to interest groups. This 
is shown by the fate of SOE reform in 2015–2016. There really is no 
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benefi t to concentrating power if that newly concentrated power needs 
to compromise with existing interest groups to achieve institutional 
change. 
Finally, there may be a deeper contradiction between the require-
ments of this stage of economic reform and the exercise of authority by 
a single individual. To be sure, an authoritative leader may be helpful 
in the fi rst stage of reform, adapting to crises and throwing off  old con-
straints. However, at a certain point, market-oriented reforms require 
the authoritative leader to step back and allow market forces to work 
without constraint. China today has developed a vigorous market econ-
omy—the greatest need at this stage is for independent regulatory and 
fi nancial institutions, which have not been a prominent part of the Xi 
Jinping reform package. Therefore, the year 2015 provided little sup-
port for the idea that an authoritative Xi Jinping leadership can contrib-
ute eff ectively to the economic reform process. 
With the failure of reform initiatives in 2015, China has been left 
without a good strategy to cope with the end of the miracle growth 
period. In a general sense, everyone understands that the “new nor-
mal” requires greater innovation, stronger orientation to domestic con-
sumers, and the shift to a service economy. Economic reform is ideally 
suited to facilitate those structural shifts. Without a successful program 
of economic reform, Xi’s China will be forced to rely on endless pro-
grams of government investment supported by an ultimately unsustain-
able increase in credit and debt.
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